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INSPECTION OF PRIVILEGED MATERIALS UNDER RULE OF
EVIDENCE 612
Witnesses routinely use privileged materials to refresh their memories for the pur-
pose of test idng. Under the common law inspection ofpriileged, meoy-refresh-
ing materials was limited to those materials that a witness actually reviewed while
testi5'ing. Privileged materials reviewed by a witness prior to testf5'ing were not
subject to inspection. Recently enacted rules of evidence on both the federal and
state levels have superseded the common law in this area, and there are indications
that inspection of privileged materials may be expanded under the various eviden-
tiay rules. This Note will examine the federal and Minnesota rules of evidence
dealing with the inspection of memog-refreshing materials, and the impact these
rules may have on witness preparation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Attorneys unhesitatingly use documents to refresh a witness' memory
either before or during testimony., The materials reviewed by the wit-
ness often consist of an attorney's work product or are subject to an attor-
ney-client privilege. Under the common law, an opponent's right to
inspect privileged, memory-refreshing documents was dependent upon
when the documents were reviewed by the witness. Privileged materials
used by a witness while testifying were subject to inspection.2 Privileged
1. See P. ROTHSTEIN, RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND
MAGISTRATES 233-34 (2d ed. 1980). The author states that the practice of preparing wit-
nesses with the help of files is extensive:
One practice of lawyers to save time, effort, or expense has been to lighten up on
witness preparation and give the witness the file .... Under this practice, ex-
pert or lay witnesses or party-witnesses are prepared in whole or part by deliver-
ing over to them the lawyer's case file or portions thereof, for them to examine at
some time prior to the hearing.
Id
2. See note 30 infta and accompanying text.
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materials reviewed prior to testifying generally were not subject to in-
spection.3 Federal Rule of Evidence 6124 may alter this practice by al-
lowing inspection of privileged materials that a witness has relied upon
before actually testifying. If Rule 612 operates in this manner, attorneys
must be more selective in what they permit a witness to review or be
faced with the possibility of forced disclosure of privileged information.
To date only a handful of courts have dealt with the effect of Rule 612
on privileged documents. Their conclusions are conflicting. 5 This Note
considers the purpose of Rule 612 and how the countervailing policies of
privilege and disclosure6 may be resolved in civil litigation. 7 In particu-
lar, the various constructions that might be given Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 612 are examined. The corresponding Minnesota rule,8 identical
to the federal rule for the purpose of this Note, 9 is analyzed to determine
if comparable interpretations are justified.
3. See note 29 infra and accompanying text.
4. FED. R. EvID. 612. The rule states in part:
[I]f a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory for the purpose of testify-
ing, either-
(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in
the interest of justice,
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to
inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evi-
dence those portions which relate to the testimony of the witness.
Id See also notes 32-35 infra and accompanying text.
5. Two federal district courts have held that privileged documents are subject to
inspection under Rule 612. See Marshall v. United States Postal Serv., 88 F.R.D. 348, 350
(D.D.C. 1980); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., 81
F.R.D. 8, 9-10 (N.D. 11. 1978). Two other federal district courts have indicated a willing-
ness to employ the rule in a similiar manner. See Cambridge Indus. Prods. Corp. v. Metal
Works, Ltd., 4 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 835, 837-38 (D. Mass. 1979); Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd in part on othergrounds, 603
F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). Another district court has inter-
preted Rule 612 to permit inspection of work product that has been used to refresh a
witness' memory, but not similarly used attorney-client materials. See Ramsey v. County
of Fresno, 7 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 950, 954 (E.D. Cal. 1980). Finally, one district court has
refused to permit the rule to be used to allow inspection of any privileged documents used
to revive a witness' memory prior to testifying. See Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Muller
& Phipps, Ltd., 85 F.R.D. 118, 119-20 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
6. See notes 64-102 infra and accompanying text.
7. Rule 612 applies to both civil and criminal litigation. The purpose of the rule is
the same as that of the Jencks Act § 102, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976), to promote credibility of
witnesses. See FED. R. EVID. 612, Advisory Committee's Note; 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BER-
GER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE $ 612[02], at 612-22 to 23 (1978). This Note, however, will
consider only the application of the rule in civil cases.
8. MINN. R. EVID. 612.
9. The Minnesota rule is subject to the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id
("Except as otherwise provided in criminal proceedings by the rules of criminal proce-
dure"). The federal rule in criminal actions is limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). Re-
garding civil litigation, the Minnesota rule's wording is substantially similar to that of the
federal rule. Compare MINN. R. EViD. 612 wih FED. R. EvID. 612.
[Vol. 7
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II. PRERULE PRACTICE
Because of the substantial length of time between events that give rise
to a lawsuit and the actual trial, witnesses may not be able to recall im-
portant aspects of a case. To overcome this problem a witness is permit-
ted to refresh his memory with a variety of aids, I0 most often written
documents. While this practice facilitates accurate testimony, it presents
several problems. A witness' memory may not in fact be revived, and his
testimony may be based solely upon the memorandum. The proper pur-
pose of the memorandum is to prompt a witness' independent memory
and not merely to substitute the writing for the witness' actual recollec-
tion. I I Improper use of a writing by a witness may be deliberate or sub-
conscious.12 The memorandum also may enable counsel to suggest to a
witness what the witness' memory should be.13 Finally, few standards
have been developed to assure trustworthiness of memory-refreshing
10. See United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1946) ("a song, a scent, a
photograph, and allusion, even a past statement known to be false" can be used to revive a
witness' memory), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 806 (1947); C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 9, at 15-16 (2d ed. E. Cleary ed. 1972); 3 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 758, at 125 (J. Chadbourn rev.
1970).
11. See note 15 infa and accompanying text.
12. See United States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883, 889 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 941
(1949). In Riccardi, Judge Kalonder described the difficulty of measuring the impact a
writing can have on a witness as follows:
Of course, the categories, present recollection revived and past recollection
recorded, are clearest in their extremes, but they are, in practice, converging
rather than parallel lines; the difference is frequently one of degree. Moreover, it
is in complication thereof that a cooperative witness, yielding to suggestion, de-
ceives himself, that a hostile witness seizes an opportunity, or that a writing is
used to convey an improper suggestion.
Id
13. Cf United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 233 (1940) (docu-
ment may result in improper communication with witness by counsel); NLRB v. Federal
Dairy Co., 297 F.2d 487, 489 (lst Cir. 1962) (improper to refresh witness' memory with
specially prepared testimonial notes); United States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883, 889 (3d
Cir.) ("trial judge must determine whether the device of refreshing recollection is merely a
subterfuge to improperly suggest to the witness the testimony expected of him"), cert. de-
mid, 337 U.S. 941 (1949); Note, Interactions Between Memog Refreshment Doclnne and Work
Product Under the Federal Rules, 88 YALE L.J. 390, 403 (1978) (inspection may prevent im-
proper communication).
Not only can counsel improperly coach a witness under the guise of memory refresh-
ment, he can expose the jury to inadmissible documents. See, e.g., Goings v. United States,
377 F.2d 753, 760 (8th Cir. 1967) (improper for counsel to read contents of document
before the jury under pretext of refreshing witness' recollection) (quoting Young v. United
States, 214 F.2d 232, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1954)); Freeland v. Peltier, 44 S.W.2d 404, 409 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1931) (trial court properly excluded testimony based solely upon contents of
memorandum).
1981]
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memoranda' 4 because the witness' testimony, not the document,' 5 is the
evidence.
Two basic safeguards were developed under the common law to
counter these potential abuses.' 6 The first safeguard was designed to
structure the discretion of the trial court in allowing the use of memory-
refreshing aids.17 Courts were to use a three-step analysis. First, a court
had to find that a witness' memory on a particular topic was exhausted
or nonexistent.18 The court then had to find that the possibility of undue
influence from the use of the document outweighed the chance of the
14. For example, the memory-refreshing document need not be made by the witness.
See, e.g., Thompson v. United States, 342 F.2d 137, 139-40 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
926 (1965); Johnston v. Earle, 313 F.2d 686, 688 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 910
(1963); People v. Griswold, 405 Ill. 533, 539, 92 N.E.2d 91, 95 (1950); Commonwealth v.
McDermott, 255 Mass. 575, 578, 152 N.E. 704, 706 (1926); Litchfield v. Paynesville, 258
Minn. 210, 216, 103 N.W.2d 402, 407 (1960) (quoting Ostrowski v. Mockridge, 242 Minn.
265, 274, 65 N.W.2d 185, 191 (1954)).
The writing need not be the original. See, e.g., Lugo v. United States, 370 F.2d 992,
994-95 (9th Cir. 1967); Johnston v. Earle, 313 F.2d 686, 688 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 910 (1963); Ammon v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 120 Minn. 438, 442, 139 N.W. 819, 820
(1913); Douglas v. Leighton, 57 Minn. 81, 83, 58 N.W. 827, 827-28 (1894).
As long as the event was still fresh in the witness' mind when the writing was made,
the writing does not have to have been made contemporaneously with the event. See, e.g.,
United States v. Tolbert, 367 F.2d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1966); Litchfield v. Paynesville, 258
Minn. 210, 216, 103 N.W.2d 402, 406-07 (1960); Farmers Elevator Co. v. Great N. Ry.,
131 Minn. 152, 155, 154 N.W. 954, 956 (1915); Sagers v. International Smelting Co., 50
Utah 423, 427, 168 P. 105, 107 (1917); State v. Little, 57 Wash. 2d 516, 519, 358 P.2d 120,
122 (1961); 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 791, at 133.
Some courts also do not require the witness to verify the accuracy of the memoranda.
See United States v. McKeever, 169 F. Supp. 426, 428-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). But see Ostrow-
ski v. Mockridge, 242 Minn. 265, 274, 65 N.W.2d 185, 191 (1954); cf Tebeau v. Baden
Equip. & Constr. Co., 295 S.W.2d 184, 189 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) ("witness . ..may be
permitted to refer to another's writing or record that he himself knows to be correct").
15. See United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 191 (4th Cir. 1975).
If the memorandum does not refresh the witness' recollection, the memorandum may
be admitted into evidence under the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay
rule. See MINN. R. EvID. 803(5). To be admissible as past recollection recorded, however,
the document must meet several qualifications: (1) the witness must have once had
knowledge of the matter the document relates to; (2) the document must be shown to
have been made or adopted by the witness; (3) when the event was still fresh in the wit-
ness' memory; and (4) the document must reflect such knowledge accurately. See id
These stringent requirements considerably narrow the materials that are admissible pursu-
ant to Rule 803(5) as opposed to the material that can prompt testimony as a memory
refresher. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 9, at 16; note 14 supra.
The difference between past recollection recorded and present recollection revived is
a constant source of confusion to the courts. See genera4'y Comment, Witness' Use of Memo-
randa. Present Recollection Revived and Past Recollection Recorded, 6 CuM. L. REV. 471 (1975).
16. See C. McCORMICK, supra note 10, § 9, at 17; 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 7, 612[01], at 612-12.
17. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 7, 612101], at 612-12.
18. See Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d 753, 760 (8th Cir. 1967); City of Minneapo-
lis v. Price, 280 Minn. 429, 435, 159 N.W.2d 776, 781 (1968) ("memoranda should not be
used to refresh a witness' memory unless it is first ascertained whether the witness can
[Vol. 7
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witness' memory being revived.19 Finally, the court had to find that the
witness' recollection actually was refreshed by the aid.
20
The second and arguably more effective safeguard, 2 1 now embodied in
Rule 612, was to allow opposing counsel to inspect the memory-refresh-
ing document and use it in the cross-examination of the witness.22 In this
way opposing counsel was afforded "a good opportunity to test the credi-
bility of the witness's claim that his memory has been revived, and to
search out any discrepancies between the writing and the testimony."23
Under the common law, an opposing party had an absolute right to in-
spect an unprivileged, memory-refreshing document when memory re-
freshment occurred on the witness stand. 24 When a witness reviewed
unprivileged, memory-refreshing material prior to testifying it was
within the discretion of the trial court whether to allow inspection.25
Courts usually found inspection was not warranted 26 because it was
recall the events in question without resort to the memorandum"); Maguire & Quick,
Testimony.: Memory and Memoranda, 3 How. L.J. 1, 20 (1957).
19. See C. MCCORMICK. supra note 10, § 9, at 17; Comment, Article VI of the Federal
Rules of Evidence: Witnesses, 36 LA. L. REV. 99, 106-07 (1975).
20. See Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d 753, 760 (8th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883, 889 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 941 (1949); C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 10, § 9, at 17; Maguire & Quick, supra note 18, at 20.
When the witness claims his memory has been refreshed and gives his testimony, it is
up to the trier of fact to weigh the "refreshed" testimony. See United States v. Cheyenne,
558 F.2d 902, 905-06 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 957 (1977).
21. Judge Weinstein describes the difficulty in preventing an abusive use of a mem-
ory-refreshing document as follows:
Although the trial judge "should in the first instance satisfy himself as to whether
the witness testifies upon a record or upon his own recollection," the cases seem
to indicate that judges are likely to honor claims of loss of memory without ex-
tensive examination when considerable time has elapsed between the event and
trial, or numerous details are involved, or the witness is of a class that frequently
testifies in like situations.
3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 7, 1612[01], at 612-10 (footnotes omitted).
22. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 9, at 17; 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 7, 612[01], at 612-13. Rule 612 embodies the right of a party to inspect
memory-refreshing material. The trial court's discretion in allowing a witness to use such
materials remains within the province of the common law.
23. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 9, at 17.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Marcus v.
United States, 422 F.2d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 1970); State v. Grunau, 273 Minn. 315, 331, 141
N.W.2d 815, 826 (1966); State v. Dunn, 246 S.E.2d 245, 252 (W. Va. 1978).
25. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 132 (1942), overruled on other grounds,
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Needelman v. United States, 261 F.2d 802,
806 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismi sed, 362 U.S. 600 (1960) (per curiam). In Goldman, the
Supreme Court stated: "We think it the better rule that where a witness does not use his
notes or memoranda in court, a party has no absolute right to have them produced and to
inspect them. . . .[A] large discretion must be allowed the trial judge." 316 U.S. at 132.
A possible exception to the rule permitting inspection only at the discretion of the
trial court has arisen in admiralty cases. See, e.g., In re Mass. Trustees of E. Gas & Fuel
Assocs., 200 F. Supp. 625, 626 (E.D. Va. 1962); Finley v. Daly Tankship Corp. (The Al-
pha), 44 F. Supp. 809, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
26. See, e.g., Morton v. Carelli, 437 P.2d 335, 336-37 (Alaska 1968); State v. Couture,
151 Conn. 213, 218, 196 A.2d 113, 115 (1963); Rose v. B.L. Cartage Co., 110 Ill. App. 2d
1981]
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feared that inspection of such materials would result in excessive prying
into an opponent's files.2 7 The modern trend rejected this reasoning, ap-
parently under the premise that the danger of false or misleading testi-
mony exists in both on-the-stand and prior-to-trial review.28
As with unprivileged documents, a party's right of inspection of privi-
leged material under the common law was dependent upon the time of
the witness' review. Inspection of privileged documents used prior to tes-
tifying was within the discretion of the court.29 If review occurred dur-
ing the witness' testimony, however, inspection was allowed because use
of privileged material on the stand constituted a waiver of the
privilege.
3 0
III. FEDERAL RULE 612
To determine the effect that Rule 612 should have on privileged mate-
rial, three areas must be considered: (1) the plain language of the rule
and its legislative history; (2) the practical consequences of permitting
inspection under the rule; and (3) the conflicting policies of privilege
and disclosure.
A. Plain Language and Legislative Histor
On its face, Federal Rule 612 does not exempt privileged documents
from its scope. Had the rule been meant to give special protection to
privileged material, it would have been a simple matter to indicate this
intention explicitly. 3' The legislative history, however, makes a broad
260, 275-76, 249 N.E.2d 199, 207 (1969); State v. Crayton, 354 S.W.2d 834, 837-38 (Mo.
1962); State v. Paschall, 182 Wash. 304, 308-09, 47 P.2d 15, 17 (1935).
27. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 9, at 18 ("Doubtless the courts have thought
that to require inspection of such papers may unduly encourage prying into an opponent's
file"). Furthermore, when a witness reviews documents out of court, the judge cannot be
certain of which documents may have refreshed the witness' memory. Cf. Note, supra note
13, at 393 (because pretrial inspection does not occur before the judge, more difficult to
determine scope of any inspection).
28. See, e.g., State v. Doty, 110 Ariz. 348, 350, 519 P.2d 47, 49 (1974); Miles v. Clair-
mont Transfer Co., 35 Mich. App. 319, 321-22, 193 N.W.2d 619, 620-21 (1971) (per
curiam); State v. Hunt, 25 N.J. 514, 525, 138 A.2d 1, 7 (1958).
29. Cf La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co., 60 F.R.D. 164, 168 (D. Del. 1973) (no
absolute right to inspect documents reviewed by witness prior to and in preparation for
testifying).
30. See id ("counsel is entitled to inspect even a privileged document which is used by
a witness to refresh his recollection when testifying"); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57
F.R.D. 11, 13 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (waiver of attorney-client privilege and work product by
allowing witness to review documents during deposition); cf. United States v. Nobles, 422
U.S. 225, 239 n.14 (1975) ("where ... counsel attempts to make a testimonial use of
[work-product] materials the normal rules of evidence come into play with respect to cross-
examination and production of documents").
31. For example, the Alaska rule specifically provides that when a claim of privilege
arises the court shall inspect the document in camera and "rule on any claim of privilege
[Vol. 7
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interpretation difficult.
Z On- The-Stand Review
The language of Rule 612 gives an opposing party an unqualified
right to inspect writings used by a witness while testifying.3 2 The fact
that the document is privileged does not seem to indicate a different re-
sult. The Advisory Committee's Note states the rule's "treatment of writ-
ings used to refresh recollection while on the stand is an accord with
settled doctrine."3 3 Since prerule practice allowed inspection of privi-
leged documents that were used while testifying,34 Rule 612 should not
alter the right of inspection.
35
In the only reported case involving Rule 612 and on-the-stand review
of privileged documents, Cambridge Industrial Products Corp. v. Metal Works,
Ltd ,36 the federal district court for the District of Massachusetts declined
to order disclosure of an attorney's work product that a witness had re-
viewed during his deposition. 37 In apparent disregard of the plain lan-
guage of Rule 612, the Cambridge court held a party's right to inspect
privileged materials used to refresh a witness' memory during testimony
is not absolute. Rather, the right to inspect is within the court's
discretion.3
8
raised." ALASKA R. EVID. 612(c). If the court upholds the privilege, the privileged or
irrelevant portions of the refreshing document are not subject to adverse inspection even if
the review occurred on the witness stand. See id 612(a).
32. See FED. R. EvID. 612.
33. Id, Advisory Committee's Note.
34. See note 30 supra.
35. [Tlhere is no room to doubt that in accordance with pre-Rules practice the
operation of privilege law and the work product doctrine is very different ...
Quite simply, the questioning party waives any claim of privilege which he
might otherwise have when he uses a writing to refresh the recollection of a wit-
ness while testifying, at least to the extent necessary to satisfy the purposes of
Rule 612.
3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 351, at 535-36 (1979).
Discussion on the floor of the House also indicates that work product used to refresh a
witness' memory while testifying is subject to disclosure under the rule: "If [work product]
. . . was used to refresh the memory of a witness would it not then be subject to inspec-
tion? If it were used while testifying. [sic] If it were used before testifying there are differ-
ent limitations on it." 120 CONG. REC. 2381 (1974).
36. 4 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 835 (D. Mass. 1979).
37. Id at 835-37.
The Federal Rules of Evidence apply to depositions as well as trials. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 30(c) ("Examination and cross-examination of witnesses in depositions may proceed as
permitted at trial under the provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence"). The corre-
sponding Minnesota rule of procedure is not as explicit, referring only generally to the
examination of hostile witnesses and adverse parties. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 30.03. Deposi-
tion testimony is admissible evidence under Minnesota practice. See id 32.01. Therefore,
it would seem logical that MINN. R. EVID. 612, which acts to test the accuracy of testi-
mony, would apply to deposition proceedings.
38. See 4 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. at 837. In part, the Cambndge court based its holding on
1981]
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The result in Cambridge stemmed from the district court's reliance on
another federal district court decision, Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co. 39 In Berkey, the court denied a Rule 612 motion to inspect work-
product documents that had been reviewed by witnesses prior to testify-
ing.40 Because the witnesses' review occurred before the witnesses had
given their testimony, the Berkey court clearly was within the plain mean-
ing of Rule 612 by exercising its discretion against disclosure.41 The Cam-
bridge court, however, did not concern itself with the distinction
embodied within the language of the rule between on-the-stand and
prior review. The Cambridge court merely followed the reasoning of Ber-
key, even though the factual circumstances were distinctly different. The
Cambridge decision, therefore, is questionable and should not be viewed
as a correct application of Rule 612. Although the Cambridge court may
have misconstrued Rule 612 with respect to the instant case, the court
did not reject out of hand the possibility that Rule 612 may be used to
overcome privilege claims. Instead, the court indicated that in future
cases any party resisting disclosure of privileged documents used to re-
fresh a witness' memory would have the burden of persuading the court
that inspection was not proper under the circumstances.42
the fact that the witness had referred to the privileged documents only in an effort to
answer specific questions put to him by opposing counsel. The court reasoned that it
would be unfair to require production because the witness had tried to give as complete an
answer as possible. Id This situation, however, would seem to be the very one in which
Rule 612 was meant to operate. The witness directly relied upon a document to supple-
ment his testimony thereby enhancing the adversary party's need to inspect the memory-
refreshing document.
39. 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'dinpart on other grounds, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). The Cambridge court's reliance upon Berkey is
emphasized by this statement: "[T]his court has chosen to borrow a page-if not a chap-
ter-from Judge Frankel in Berkey Photo, Inc..... .4 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. at 836.
40. 74 F.R.D. at 615-17.
41. See note 43 infa and accompanying text.
42. [T]his court does not intend to suggest that in all, or any, future cases, a
balancing test such as used in the present case should be the proper ap-
proach. . . . Thus, this order should not be construed as precedent to be mecha-
nistically applied in the future. To the contrary, it should be considered as a
suggestion to the Bar that the interplay between Rule 612 and the work product
doctrine (and perhaps other non-constitutional privileges) is a real one ....
Accordingly, in future cases which are referred to this court, counsel who resist
disclosure of work product material vis a vis application of Rule 612 should be
prepared to make a clear and compelling showing why the provisions of Rule
612 (and the underlying rationale of those provisions) should yield to the quali-
fied work product privilege.
4 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. at 837-38. Judge Frankel, in Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980), similarly warned that in future cases the court
would be less inclined to reject claims for disclosure of privileged materials under Rule
612. Id at 617 ("To put the point succinctly, there will be hereafter powerful reason to
hold that materials considered work product should be withheld from prospective wit-
nesses if they are to be withheld from opposing parties.").
[Vol. 7
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2. Prior Use
The effect of Rule 612 on privileged material used to refresh a witness'
memory prior to testifying is even less clear. Inspection in instances of
prior use is allowed "if the court in its discretion determines [inspection]
• . . is necessary in the interests of justice."43 Retention of this discre-
tionary aspect of the rule corresponds to the common-law approach 44
and may indicate that Congress did not intend to modify the past prac-
tice of prohibiting inspection of documents used prior to testifying.45
This interpretation is supported by the fact that as originally proposed
Rule 612 would not have recognized a distinction between prior and
concurrent use. 46 Regardless of when a witness reviewed documents, the
opposing party would have had an absolute right of inspection.
In Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Muller & Phipps, Ltd ,47 the federal court
for the Western District of Missouri stated that Rule 612 was a mere
codification of the common law.48 The court interpreted this to mean
that "little if any widening of disclosure obligations" resulted from the
enactment of the rule.4 9 The court further indicated that privileged doc-
uments should be given "special discretionary safeguards against
disclosure."5
0
The legislative history of Rule 612, however, clearly shows that the
rule was intended to be more flexible. The Advisory Committee's Note
expresses the view that the rule is a step away from the rigid, common-
law classification between prior and concurrent review. 5 1 The report of
43. FED. R. EVID. 612.
44. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
45. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
46. The rule, as initially promulgated, read in part: "If a witness uses a writing to
refresh his memory, either before or while testifing, an adverse party is entitled ... to inspect
it .. " Fed. R. Evid. 6-12 (Preliminary Draft 1969), repritedzi COMMITTEE ON RULES
OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DIS-
TRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 134-35 (1969) (emphasis added).
47. 85 F.R.D. 118 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
48. Id at 119 (dictum) ("The language ultimately adopted is said to codify 'existing
federal law.' "). Segeneraly 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 35, § 351, at 534-
36.
In Schlitz, plaintiff sought production of 39 letters that were protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege. Defendant's attorney was said to have "looked at" these letters before
his deposition. 85 F.R.D. at 119. The court held that plaintiff could not invoke Rule 612
because it could not be shown that the witness had actually studied any of the letters for
the purpose of refreshing his memory. Id at 120. Because the court found that Rule 612
did not apply, any discussion of the rule's effect on privileges was not necessary to the
court's decision. For a discussion of the necessity of a document affecting a witness' mem-
ory before Rule 612 will apply, see notes 83-96 infra and accompanying text.
49. 85 F.R.D. at 119.
50. Id at 120.
51. The bulk of case law has, however, denied the existence of any right of access
by the opponent when the writing is used prior to taking the stand, though the
19811
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the House Committee on the Judiciary also indicates that the discretion-
ary aspect of the rule was retained to prevent the wholesale disclosure of
a large number of documents that a witness might have reviewed prior to
testifying. 52 This appears to be a concession to practicality rather than
an approval of prerule practice.53 The theory, therefore, that Rule 612
represents a new attitude toward disclosure of documents used to refresh
a witness' recollection cannot be dismissed easily.
Regardless of how Rule 612 changes past practice, the rule should not
be construed mechanically so that all materials reviewed prior to testify-
ing are either immune from disclosure or open to inspection. Except for
privileged materials, the rule may promote inspection of most materials
used prior to testifying. This construction conforms to both the view of
the Advisory Committee that the rule generally favors disclosure54 and
the statement by the House Committee on the Judiciary that "nothing in
the Rule be construed as barring the assertion of a privilege with respect
to writings used by a witness to refresh his memory." 55 Thus, under this
interpretation the rule would represent an expansion over the common
law in that many materials reviewed prior to testifying would be open to
inspection although privileged documents would remain protected.
An interpretation that favors inspection of only nonprivileged materi-
als used before the witness takes the stand may harmonize conflicting
views of Rule 612, but such a construction may not be justified.56 The
judge may have discretion in the matter. . . . An increasing group of cases has
repudiated the distinction . . . and this position is believed to be correct.
FED. R. EVID. 612, Advisory Committee's Note (citations omitted).
52. The Committee amended the Rule so as still to require the production of
writing used by a witness while testifying, but to render the production of writ-
ings used by a witness to refresh his memory before testifying discretionary with
the court in the interests ofjustice, as is the case under existing federal law ...
The Committee considered that permitting an adverse party to require the pro-
duction of writings used before testifying could result in fishing expeditions
among a multitude of papers which a witness may have used in preparing for
trial.
REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. REP.
No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprthtedn [1974] U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 7075, 7086
(citation omitted) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY].
53. Representative Hungate described some of the potential problems that concerned
the Committee:
The rule was originally broader than this, as I recall it. We have tried to narrow
the past rule, the rule that one point could have meant bringing in everything
you used to refresh your memory, and the committee has sought to restrict that.
You could use the classic examples, for instance, of patent cases or antitrust cases
where you might have several large railroad boxcars full of documents, and to
force them to be brought in could prove to be harassment.
120 CONG. REC. 2381-82 (1974).
54. See note 51 supra.
55. REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 52, at 13.
56. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) ("There are intimations that Rule 612 was intended to leave privileges generally
untouched, but other evidences weigh against a conclusion that the subject can approach
[Vol. 7
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House Committee's comment with respect to the assertion of privileges is
not limited to cases of prior review, and inspection of privileged docu-
ments used by a witness on the stand seems to be permissible.57 It ap-
pears to be incorrect, therefore, to read the House Committee's comment
as a prohibition of the use of Rule 612 to inspect any privileged
materials.
The wording of Rule 612 and its legislative history provide courts with
no concrete guidelines for applying the rule. The legislative history has
been viewed to prohibit inspection of privileged documents reviewed
prior to testifying.58 Courts that have allowed, or are willing to allow,
Rule 612 to overcome privilege claims, however, obviously have not re-
garded the legislative history as dispositive on the issue of inspection.
B Practical Consequences of the Rule
At least with respect to the inspection of privileged documents, the
strongest arguments against interpreting Rule 612 as a sweeping, sub-
stantive change in the common law are the practical consequences of
such a construction. The most obvious problem is the ease with which
the rule could be circumvented in cases of prior review. Instead of sim-
ply handing documents over to a witness for review, an attorney could
use the privileged materials to coach the witness verbally.5 9 This prac-
tice, apart from avoiding Rule 612, 60 would present the danger of substi-
tuting counsel's testimony for that of the witness. When the witness
reviews documents, he should be refreshing his own memory
independently.
Furthermore, forcing a "stark" choice between allowing a witness to
review privileged documents and testify fully or testify from his un-
such simplicity."), rev'd in part on other grounds, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1093 (1980).
57. See notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.
58. See Cambridge Indus. Prods. Corp. v. Metal Works, Ltd., 4 Fed. R. Evid. Serv.
835, 836 (D. Mass. 1979); S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL 377 (2d ed. 1977).
59. See Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Muller & Phipps, Ltd., 85 F.R.D. 118, 120 n.2
(W.D. Mo. 1980).
60. Because the witness had never reviewed the document personally, Rule 612 may
not apply. Opposing counsel, however, could argue that the document has affected the
witness' memory just as if he had reviewed the document itself and thereby be within the
scope of the rule. Although such an argument may be technically correct, no criteria exist
to determine exactly which documents in fact refreshed the witness' recollection. In all
likelihood, the witness would not know which particular document had been used by
counsel, if the witness even realized that his memory had been refreshed by the use of a
writing. Therefore, it would be difficult both to determine if the rule's requirements are
initially met and which documents, if any, were relied upon by the witness in formulating
his testimony. See notes 89-96 inf)a and accompanying text.
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refreshed recollection6i actually may deprive the court of valuable infor-
mation. Counsel may in fact decide to withhold the privileged
documents from a witness because of the possibility of forced disclosure.
This would preclude the witness with an uncertain or blank memory
from testifying. Ironically, the rule, rather than promoting "the ascer-
tainment of the truth" by bringing more information before the court,62
could result in less information or inaccurate testimony. In one federal
district court's view, the risk of "fabrication and mistake" that could re-
sult from not permitting inspection of privileged materials used to revive
a witness' recollection simply does not outweigh the benefits gained by
allowing unfettered witness review.63 Certainly, the use of nonprivileged
documents to refresh a witness' memory would avoid disclosure
problems. There may be circumstances, however, in which the only
thing that could refresh the witness' memory is privileged.
C Privilege and Disclosure
Any meaningful evaluation of Rule 612 must take into account the
conflicting principles of privilege and disclosure. In fact, the manner in
which courts have interpreted the rule corresponds with the priority that
the particular court has given the two doctrines. Courts that consider
protection of privileged materials to be of greater importance than al-
lowing a party to inspect documents that a witness has reviewed proba-
bly will not allow Rule 612 to overcome a privilege. The federal court
for the Western District of Missouri, in Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Muller
- Phipps, Ltd ,64 explained that the need to keep confidential matters
secret "overrides" the need for disclosure. 65 On the other hand, courts
willing to permit inspection of privileged documents under Rule 612 em-
phasize the desirability of permitting disclosure to as great a degree as
possible.66 These courts rely upon the premise that the "paramount pur-
pose" of the rules of discovery and evidence is the "ascertainment of the
truth," 67 and that this purpose is best achieved by making available to
61. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
rev'd n part on other grounds, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
62. See notes 66-67 infra and accompanying text.
63. See Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Muller & Phipps, Ltd., 85 F.R.D. 118, 120 n.2
(W.D. Mo. 1980).
64. 85 F.R.D. 118 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
65. Id at 120 n.2.
66. See Prucha v. M & N Modern Hydraulic Press Co., 76 F.R.D. 207,210 (W.D. Wis.
1977) (ends of fairness best served by allowing full disclosure of documents relied on in
refreshing memory); note 67 infia.
67. See Cambridge Indus. Prods. Corp. v. Metal Works, Ltd., 4 Fed. R. Evid. Serv.
835, 837 (D. Mass. 1979) ("the spirit-if not the letter-of Rule 612 is the ascertainment
of the truth, and that worthy goal might well outweigh the rationale underpinning the
work product doctrine"); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Underwriters Laboratories,
Inc., 81 F.R.D. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1978) ("If the paramount purpose of federal discovery rules
is the ascertainment of the truth, the fact that a document was used to refresh one's recol-
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the parties and the court as much reliable information as possible. Since
Rule 612 enables a party to test the accuracy of witnesses' testimony
more thoroughly, a broad application of the rule is justified under this
view.
I. Waiver
In light of the long-standing recognition given privileges by the courts,
the policy of full disclosure, without more, would not justify inspection
under Rule 612 of privileged materials reviewed by a witness. The very
purpose of privileges is to protect certain information from disclosure. 68
When the privilege has been expressly or impliedly waived, however, in-
spection of privileged documents under the rule may be warranted. In-
deed, the decisions involving privileges under Rule 612 discuss the
possible applicability of waiver.69
To be protected from disclosure in judicial proceedings, information
covered by a privilege must be kept confidential. 7o A breach of confiden-
tiality is deemed a waiver of the privilege and the information is subject
to disclosure. 7i When a client consents to a witness reviewing documents
lection prior to his testimony is of little significance."); Dubose v. Bache & Co., 18 Fed. R.
Serv. 2d 1519, 1519 (W.D. Tex. 1974) (philosophy of evidentiary rules and discovery is to
allow broad access to relevant information; although case prior to enactment of Rule 612,
court referred to appropriateness of rule promoting disclosure); 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, .rra note 7, $ 612[01], at 612-16 ("judges interpreting Rule 612 should ...
recognize the paramount importance of ascertaining the truth").
68. See, e.g., United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 281 (6th Cir.) (communications
between attorney and client are "privileged from disclosure, even for the purposes of the
administration of justice'), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964); Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp.,
434 F. Supp. 136, 144 (D. Del. 1977) (same); National Texture Corp. v. Hymes, 282
N.W.2d 890, 895 (Minn. 1979) (attorney-client communications are protected from disclo-
sure); Kahl v. Minnesota Wood Specialty, Inc., 277 N.W.2d 395,398 (Minn. 1979) (same);
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2291, at 554 (McNaughton rev.
1961) ("the privilege remains an exception to the general duty to disclose").
69. See Marshall v. United States Postal Serv., 88 F.R.D. 348, 350 (D.D.C. 1980);
Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Muller & Phipps, Ltd., 85 F.R.D. 118, 120 n.2 (W.D. Mo.
1980); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd
in part on othergrowds, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir.) (it is essential to
claim of privilege that communication was made and maintained in confidence), cert. de-
nied, 426 U.S. 952 (1976); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81-82 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 867 (1973); In re Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 870 (D. Minn. 1979) (same); In
re Victor, 422 F. Supp. 475, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (same); Schwartz v. Wenger, 267 Minn.
40, 42, 124 N.W.2d 489, 491 (1963) (attorney-client privilege limited to confidential com-
munications); Brown v. St. Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 34, 62 N.W.2d 688, 700 (1954)
(same). See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 68, § 2311.
71. See, e.g., In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir.) ("disclosure is viewed as an
indication that confidentiality is no longer intended or as a waiver of the privilege'), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 145 (8th Cir. 1972) ("dis-
closure effectively waived the privilege'); In re Langswager, 392 F. Supp. 783, 786 (N.D.
Il1. 1975) (once information is "revealed to third persons the element of confidentiality is
1981)
13
et al.: Inspection of Privileged Materials Under Rule of Evidence 612
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1981
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
that are protected by the attorney-client privilege, it is apparent that the
client does not consider the contents of such documents to be sufficiently
sensitive to be kept secret. The witness' testimony in open court about
the topic, at least indirectly, serves to support the assumption that the
party no longer should be afforded the protection of the privilege.72 In
principle the same argument applies to attorneys who permit witnesses to
review work product. 73 A waiver may occur from witness review,
destroyed and with it the privilege"); Magida cx re. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Continental
Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) ("Once the confidential matter has been dis-
closed, it is no longer a secret and the privilege . . . disappears."); Texaco, Inc. v. Phoenix
Steel Corp., 264 A.2d 523, 525 (Del. Ch. 1970) ("disclosure to an outsider" results in
waiver); Schwartz v. Wenger, 267 Minn. 40, 43, 124 N.W.2d 489, 492 (1963) (third person
overhearing conversation between attorney and client results in waiver).
72. See, e.g., United States v. King, 484 F.2d 924, 927-28 (10th Cir. 1973) (putting
former attorney on stand to testify about privileged matters waives attorney-client privi-
lege); People v. Poulin, 27 Cal. App. 3d 54, 64, 103 Cal. Rptr. 623, 630 (1972) (failure to
object to testimony concerning privileged information that witness overheard waives privi-
lege); State ex re. Schuler v. Tahash, 278 Minn. 302, 308, 154 N.W.2d 200, 205 (1967) (by
discussing professional communication client impliedly waives privilege); cf. Julrik
Prods., Inc. v. Chester, 38 Cal. App. 3d 807, 811, 113 Cal. Rptr. 527, 529 (1974) (waiver
where client testified on cross-examination as to privileged topic).
73. The attorney-client privilege and the work-product privilege are based upon dif-
ferent policy considerations. Therefore, the waiver of one does not necessarily mean that
the other also is waived. See Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 487
F.2d 480, 483 n. 12 (4th Cir. 1973). Because the purpose of the work-product doctrine is to
shield attorney's mental impressions, opinions, and legal theories from opposing counsel,
see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509-12 (1947), courts have held that merely showing
work-product documents to third parties does not constitute a waiver. See, e.g., GAF Corp.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 85 F.R.D. 46, 51-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); American Standard, Inc. v.
Bendix Corp., 71 F.R.D. 443, 446 (W.D. Mo. 1976). The rationale for this result is:
The work-product concept, however, designed as it is to promote the effective-
ness of the lawyer's trial preparations, focuses on litigation. The policies support-
ing the concept do not seem to require general secrecy, but merely secrecy from
possible adversaries. In so far as trial preparations may be communicated to
third persons without substantially increasing the opportunities for potential ad-
versaries to obtain the information, it seems that work-product protection should
continue. Therefore, disclosure of work-product materials to people with a gen-
eral common interest, such as business advisers of a client, does not warrant the
conclusion that the protection has been waived. Furthermore, the technical
rules of waiver developed with respect to the attorney-client privilege have been
influenced, at least in part, by the fact that the privilege is absolute. Since the
work-product protection only exists in the absence of a showing of good cause,
there is less need to look for behavior indicating a waiver.
Developments in the Law--Dscovery, 74 HARv. L. REv. 940, 1045 (1961) (footnotes omitted).
On the other hand, courts have held testimonial use of work product to be a waiver.
See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 n.14 (1975); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d
326, 339 n.24 (8th Cir. 1977); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215,
1222-23 (4th Cir. 1976). Refreshing a witness' memory with work-product documents and
then having him testify would seem to fall within the testimonial-use waiver mentioned
above:
The tendency has been to confine the [work-product] doctrine to analysis and
trial strategy, as it is antithetical to any general policy favoring disclosure. Can
an attorney who uses notes, memoranda, or other private material to refresh the
[Vol. 7
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thereby eliminating any reason to protect the material from disclosure.
In Wheelhng-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. ,74 the
federal court for the Northern District of Illinois used this analysis. The
Wheehhg-Pittsburgh court held that the plaintiff waived the attorney-cli-
ent privilege by allowing a witness to review a privileged file in prepara-
tion for a deposition. 75 Because the privilege was lost through the
waiver, defendant was granted the right to inspect the file pursuant to
Rule 612.76
Another common-law waiver rule has application in cases of memory
refreshment. This rule prevents a party from disclosing portions of a
privileged communication selectively.77 Once disclosure passes a certain
point, fairness dictates that the privilege be waived and that opposing
memory of his witness be said to fall within the policy of the doctrine? It would
seem not, if the policy is designed to protect the attorney's privacy and not to
afford an affirmative advantage.
Comment, Witnesses Under Article VI of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 WAYNE L.
REV. 1236, 1274 (1969) (footnote omitted).
The use of work product to refresh a witness' memory may not be proper in any event
because the practice could be tantamount to leading the witness. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, supra note 7, 612[041, at 612-33 ("Resort to notes embodying an attorney's
theories and mental impressions could be barred on analogy to the prohibition against
leading [questions], without reaching the question of whether production of the notes
would be barred by a work product rule.") (footnote omitted). Moreover, since witnesses
generally may testify only to facts not opinions, see Note, supra note 13, at 404 n.90, the
opinions and thought processes contained in attorney's work product are not proper topics
for testimony.
74. 81 F.R.D. 8 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
75. d. at 9. A recent decision, Marshall v. United States Postal Serv., 88 F.R.D. 348
(D.D.C. 1980), has concurred with the Wheelihg-Pittsburg court that permitting a witness to
refresh his memory with the use of privileged documents results in a waiver of such privi-
lege. See id. at 350 ("it is also apparent that once a document is used to refresh the recol-
lection of a witness, privileges as to that document have been waived").
76. The Wheeh'ng-Pttsburgh court stated: "[W]e find that Mr. Flanders' use of said
documents to refresh his recollection immediately prior to his deposition hearing, served as
effective waiver of any such privilege. Consequently, said documents are discoverable
pursuant to Rule 612 . . . ." 81 F.R.D. at 9.
77. See, e.g., Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., 32 F.2d 195, 201
(2d Cir. 1929); Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal.
1976); IT & T Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 185 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Lee Nat'l
Corp. v. Deramus, 313 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Del. 1970); cf Swanson v. Domning, 251
Minn. 110, 118, 86 N.W.2d 716, 722 (1957) (client cannot testify to part of privileged
communication and then try to exclude remainder).
The party against whom the waiver applies does not have to intend that the partial
disclosure operate as a waiver. See Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co.,
314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 1970); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D.
461, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1954); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 68, § 2327, at 636 ("when his con-
duct touches a certain point of disclosure, fairness requires that his privilege shall cease
whether he intended that result or not"). But see Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields,
18 F.R.D. 448, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (must be evidence that client intended to waive privi-
lege). Thus, when a witness is allowed to review privileged materials to refresh his mem-
ory and then testify on the subject matter of the privilege, a waiver should result, even
19811
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counsel be allowed an opportunity to inspect the document to prevent
fraud or unfair advantage. 78 A witness whose memory is refreshed by
review of a privileged document may represent an example of such par-
tial disclosure because the testimony may reflect only certain portions of
the document. If a privilege bars an opponent from cross-examining the
witness with the aid of the memory-refreshing document, the witness'
testimony essentially would go unchallenged. 79 Yet, the attorney, upon
inspection, may be able to establish that the remainder of the document
contains conflicting information or show that the witness misinterpreted
parts of the document.
If the holder of the privilege reviews a document and then testifies, no
waiver has occurred because no one outside the scope of the privilege sees
the material. A waiver based upon partial disclosure, however, would
encompass such a practice. This type of waiver is initiated by the mere
act of revealing a portion of the privileged material.
Problems exist, however, with applying waiver theories to instances of
memory refreshment. If the client has not consented directly to a witness
reviewing the privileged materials in question, it is uncertain whether a
waiver of the attorney-client privilege is appropriate. Since the privilege
belongs to the client and not counsel,80 normally only the client may
waive the privilege.81 If an attorney permits a witness to review privi-
though the party did not know that the witness' testimony would deal with the privileged
topic.
78. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 63 F.R.D. 88, 92 (D. Del.
1974) ("manifestly unfair to allow Fibreboard to make factual assertions and then deny
International an opportunity to uncover the foundation for those assertions in order to
contradict them"); IT & T Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 185 (M.D. Fla. 1973)
("privilege was intended as a shield, not a sword. Consequently, a party may not insist
upon the protection of the privilege for damaging communications while disclosing other
selected communications because they are self-serving."); American Optical Corp. v. Med-
tronic, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 426, 432 (D. Mass. 1972) ("Serious questions of fairness arise espe-
cially when a party makes statements under oath to secure for himself a benefit while
denying his opponent, under a claim of privilege, the opportunity to contradict those
statements."); f Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35, 42-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (par-
tial disclosure not a waiver in light of specific agreement between the parties to that
effect).
79. In Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd
in part on other grounds, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980), the
court stated:
[lit is disquieting to posit that a party's lawyer may "aid" a witness with items of
work product and then prevent totally the access that might reveal and counter-
act the effects of such assistance. ...
• . . Again, however, the sweeping language of the cited authorities [on
work product protection] has never been challenged by an instance where such
immunized materials have been deliberately employed to prepare-and thus,
very possibly, to influence and shape-testimony, with the anticipation that
these effects should remain forever unknowable and undiscoverable.
Id at 616.
80. See generaly 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 68, at § 2321.
81. See, e.g., Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir.
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leged documents to refresh the witness' recollection, it is unclear whether
this constitutes a legitimate waiver of the client's privilege. The courts
that have construed Rule 612 to date have not been confronted with this
issue. Nevertheless, when the control that an attorney possesses over the
tactical decisions of litigation is considered, the attorney should be held
to have the implied authority to waive the client's privilege by allowing
witness review.8 2 Because the client also gains the benefit of the witness'
testimony, a waiver would appear to be an equitable result.
An additional problem is posed by the application of waiver to mem-
ory refreshment given the limits of Rule 612. The rule is specifically
designed to facilitate inspection of only those writings that have an effect
on a witness' testimony.8 3 It is not a general discovery device.8 4 Al-
1967); Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 1965); American Cyanamid Co.
v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 87 (D. Del. 1962).
82. Since the attorney has implied authority from the client. . . to make admis-
sions and otherwise to act in all that concerns the management of the cause, all
disclosures (oral or written) voluntarily made to opposing party or to third per-
sons in the course of negotiations for settlement, or in the course of taking ad-
verse steps in litigation ... are receivable as being made under an implied
waiver of privilege, giving authority to disclose the confidences when necessary
in the opinion of the attorney. This is so unless it appears that the attorney has
acted in bad faith toward the client.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 68, § 2325, at 633. See Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77
F.R.D. 455, 460 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (attorney can waive attorney-client privilege through
voluntary disclosure in course of representation); Sprader v. Mueller, 265 Minn. 111, 117,
121 N.W.2d 176, 180 (1963) (counsel has implied authority to disclose privileged informa-
tion when furthering client's cause); ef Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Parsons, 561 F.2d 671,
674-75 (7th Cir. 1977) (in-house counsel has implied authority to waive attorney-client
privilege; unclear if authority derived from attorney status or corporate position). But see
generaly Note, The Attorney-Client tivilege Afer Attorney Disclosure, 78 MICH. L. REV. 927
(1980).
83. Ste Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Muller & Phipps, Ltd., 85 F.R.D. 118, 120
(W.D. Mo. 1980) (must establish "actual use" of document by witness); Berkey Photo, Inc.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("sufficient 'impact' on .. .
testimony to trigger the application of Rule 612"), reovdinpart on other grounds , 603 F.2d 263
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
84. Under the discovery rules, a party can inspect materials "regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant . . . . It is not ground for objection that the material
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(1). The
federal rule is to the same effect. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
As a rule of evidence, Rule 612 is not concerned with materials that might lead to
admissible evidence. The witness' testimony, which may be in part the result of reviewing
privileged materials, is already in evidence. The need to test the credibility of the testi-
mony, therefore, is an immediate one. This need, however, is limited to only those docu-
ments that did in fact affect the testimony. The cases indicate that inspection of materials
under Rule 612 have been restricted in exactly this manner. See Wheeling-Pittsburgh
Steel Corp. v. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 8, 10-11 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (party
cannot search an opponent's files in "wholesale fashion'); Prucha v. M & N Modern Hy-
draulic Press Co., 76 F.R.D. 207, 210 (W.D. Wis. 1977) ("not authorizing 'fishing expedi-
tion' into files").
1981]
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though some courts have restricted waivers arising from partial disclo-
sure to the narrow subject matter actually revealed,85 other courts have
held such waivers to embrace all privileged documents dealing with the
same topic.86 Without considering the relative merits of the two ap-
proaches in general, the former more clearly is suited to situations of
memory refreshment.8 7 Any broader waiver would go beyond the pur-
pose of Rule 612 because materials the witness had never seen, and
which therefore could not have influenced the witness' testimony, sud-
denly would be open to the scrutiny of an opposing party.
A final problem is determining exactly which privileged documents
the witness reviewed "for the purpose of testifying."88 A witness may
very well review a number of documents. But if the documents do not
affect the witness' testimony, neither waiver nor Rule 612 would be nec-
essary because there would be no reason to test the witness' recollection
against the document.
When review takes place on the witness stand, there is no difficulty in
assessing the use of a particular document and its effect on the witness'
testimony. The document is used before the court89 and, since a witness
may not use a document unless his memory is exhausted, 90 the very fact
that the witness can continue his testimony demonstrates the document's
impact on the testimony. In cases of review prior to testifying, however,
these determinations are not made as easily. The only way to determine
which documents the witness reviewed is to ask the witness and, as al-
ways, hope he answers truthfully. 9 1 Establishing what "impact"92 prior
85. See, e.g., Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 156 (D. Del. 1977) (inad-
vertent disclosure; waiver limited only to those documents produced); IBM Corp. v.
Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Del. 1968) (waiver limited to specific materials
disclosed).
86. See, e.g., Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Indus., Inc., 22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1015,
1017 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("having disclosed portions of specific communications, defendants
have waived attorney-client privilege as to entire contents of those communications");
Garfinkle v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 64 F.R.D. 688, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("entitled to all rele-
vant documents"); IT & T Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 186 (M.D. Fla. 1973)
("if a party-client introduces part of his correspondence with his attorney, the production
of all of the correspondence could be demanded'); Lee Nat'l Corp. v. Deramus, 313 F.
Supp. 224, 227 (D. Del. 1970) ("all occasions when this subject matter was discussed with
counsel [must] be revealed"); cf Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215,
1222 (4th Cir. 1976) (broad, subject-matter waiver may be applicable to disclosure of
attorney-client privilege, but not work product).
87. See Marshall v. United States Postal Serv., 88 F.R.D. 348, 351 (D.D.C. 1980)
(inspection pursuant to Rule 612 granted, but waiver limited to privileged documents
actually reviewed by witness).
88. See FED. R. EvID. 612.
89. See State v. Grunau, 273 Minn. 315, 332, 141 N.W.2d 815, 827 (1966) ("obvious
because paper or memorandum is present at the time the witness is testifying').
90. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
91. See Note, supra note 13, at 394 & n.28.
92. "[A]ccess is limited only to those Writings which may fairly be said in fact to have
[Vol. 7
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review may have had on the witness' testimony is more difficult still.
Once again, asking the witness if review of a particular document aided
his recollection is one method. Requesting the court to inspect the docu-
ments in camera and determine which portions would appear to be re-
lated to the witness' testimony also may be a workable procedure if the
number of documents is not excessive. In his treatise on the federal rules,
however, Judge Weinstein indicates that a connection between memory
refreshment and review may not always be apparent on the basis of the
subject matter of the testimony or what the witness remembers. 93 Thus,
Judge Weinstein believes that when it is at least arguable that a docu-
ment has had an impact on a witness' testimony, inspection should be
allowed "since Rule 612 favors unmasking the pretrial refreshment pro-
cess."94 Judge Weinstein's comment, however, is directed toward gener-
alized situations, not those specifically involving privileges.95 In cases in
which it is unclear if review of privileged documents has affected the
witness' testimony, any doubt should be resolved in favor of protecting
the privilege.96
an impact upon the testimony of the witness." FED. R. EvID. 612, Advisory Committee's
Note.
93. Determining whether the writing contains matter not related to the subject
matter of the testimony is somewhat more difficult .... A writing which on its
face does not appear to refer to the subject matter of the witness' testimony may
still, because of the vagaries of the human mind, be the stimulus which triggered
the witness' recollection of the seemingly unrelated matter to which he testified.
3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 7, 612[05], at 612-38.
94. Id
95. Paragraph 612[05] speaks only to the general procedure under Rule 612. The
interaction between the rule and the attorney-client or work-product privileges is dis-
cussed specifically in paragraph 612[04].
96. Permitting inspection of privileged materials in cases in which it is questionable
whether the materials aided a witness' memory presents the possibility of the rule becom-
ing more of a discovery device than a rule of evidence. If the contents of a document and
a witness' testimony are so tenuously related that the memory-jogging value of the docu-
ment is not readily apparent by in camera review, it is hard to imagine the usefulness of
the document in promoting more thorough cross-examination. Privileged information
would be revealed without advancing the ostensible purpose of the rule. See note 83 supra.
A strong counterargument can be made even though it is unclear what effect review may
have had on the witness' memory and testimony. This argument's rationale is based upon
one of the fundamental weaknesses of privileges:
[B]enefits [of the attorney-client privilege] are all indirect and speculative; its
obstruction [is] plain and concrete. . . .It is worth preserving for the sake of
general policy, but it is nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation of the truth.
It ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent
with the logic of its principle.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 68, § 2292, at 554. Many courts have agreed with Professor
Wigmore's restrictive interpretation of the attorney-client privilege. Sr, e.g., Diversified
Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d
900, 907 (4th Cir. 1965). Thus, if a privilege is narrowly construed as an initial matter,
inspection under Rule 612 should result if there is the slightest chance that the witness'
memory has been influenced by the privileged document in question.
1981]
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When waiver is acknowledged, Rule 612 in and of itself would not
conflict with claims of privilege. 97 The rule could be used after a waiver
has rendered the once privileged material unprotected. Employed in this
manner, the rule would harmonize the seemingly conflicting views of the
Advisory and House Committees mentioned earlier.98 Parties generally
would be able to inspect documents reviewed prior to testifying, some-
thing that often was not achieved under the common law.99 At the same
time, the rule itself would not "bar the assertion" of any privilege. too For
example, if a witness reviews a document prior to testifying, an opponent
could seek inspection of the document pursuant to Rule 612. If the docu-
ment is unprivileged, disclosure should be ordered. If the document is
subject to a privilege, the party that permitted the review could assert
the privilege to thwart inspection. The opponent then could argue that
the use of the privileged document by the witness constitutes a waiver of
the privilege. If the court finds that a waiver did occur, disclosure would
be appropriate, but not solely because of the rule. In Joseph Schh'az Brew-
ing Co. v. Muller & Phipps, Ltd ,IOhowever, waiver and Rule 612 working
together was expressly rejected.10 2 Therefore, any resolution of how Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 612 operates with respect to privileged materials
still is uncertain.
IV. THE MINNESOTA RULE
Consistent with past practice in Minnesota state courts,10 3 Minnesota
Rule of Evidence 612104 allows the inspection of writings used by a wit-
ness to revive his memory while testifying. The right of inspection is
absolute. 0 5 The Committee Comment appended to the rule also indi-
97. See 3 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 35, § 351, at 536 ("It is not the
operation of Rule 612 ... that results in inspection, but the fact that voluntary disclosure
waives the protection of privileges."); P. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 1, at 142 ("A sensible view
would be that if the holder of the privilege is responsible for its use by the witness, privi-
lege is waived. This would not be a result of the rule, but of principles of waiver .... ");
3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 7, 612[04], at 612-35 ("Generally, privileged
material used to refresh before trial should not be shown [to opposing counsel] unless the
use in refreshing waived the privilege.').
98. Se notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text.
99. See note 26 supra.
100. REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 52, at 13.
101. 85 F.R.D. 118 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
102. See id at 120 n.2 ("Adoption of a waiver theory seems dubious as a matter of
policy .... ").
103. MINN. R. EvID. 612, Committee Comment ("rule continues existing practice").
104. MINN. R. EvID. 612.
105. In State v. Grunau, 273 Minn. 315, 141 N.W.2d 815 (1966), the Minnesota
Supreme Court stated: "[W]e have followed the rule that where a witness uses any paper
or memorandum on the stand for the purpose of refreshing his memory the opposing party
has the right to inspect such paper or memorandum, and to use it for cross-examination or
impeachment." Id at 331, 141 N.W.2d at 826 (emphasis in original).
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cates that "[t]he rule substantially expands the common law approach by
requiring production, within the discretion of the Court, of writings that
were reviewed by a witness in preparation for testifying." 0 6 Thus, in
general terms, the treatment of memory-refreshing documents under the
Minnesota rule parallels the federal rule.107
The Minnesota rule, however, may not leave as much room for argu-
ment on the effect of the rule on privileged documents as does the federal
rule. The Committee Comment specifically states that in cases involving
work product, common-law principles rather than the rule control a
party's right of inspection.108 This explicit treatment of work product
under the Minnesota rule cures one uncertainty present in the federal
rule.109 Similar to the House Committee on the Judiciary, the Minne-
sota Committee Comment also contains the admonition that nothing in
the rule be "read to disregard applicable privileges that are validly as-
serted."110 When the Minnesota Committee Comment regarding the
treatment of work product is considered in conjunction with the above
statement concerning other privileges, a strong argument is presented
that the rule alone should not overcome privileges.
This does not necessarily mean privileged materials may be used with
impunity to prime a witness. A common-law waiver clearly can apply to
work product;"' and, if the circumstances warrant,1t2 a waiver also
could prevent a party from validly asserting a claim of privilege. Thus,
while Rule 612 and waiver working together is a possible resolution of
Rule 612 and its effect on privileged documents in federal cases,' 1 3 the
combination seems to be required under the Minnesota rule before in-
spection of privileged materials is justified.
106. MINN. R. EVID. 612, Committee Comment. Prior to the enactment of the rule,
the supreme court had expressed the view that no fundamental difference existed between
prior and concurrent memory refreshment:
If the witness relies on the memorandum or notes to refresh his recollection,
and his testimony is based upon such refreshed memory, we see no rational basis
for distinguishing between a paper or memorandum referred to prior to the trial
and one used while on the stand. In either case, the right to compare it with the
witness' testimony rests on the same foundation.
State v. Grunau, 273 Minn. 315, 330, 141 N.W.2d 815, 827 (1966).
107. See notes 32-35 (on-the-stand review under the federal rule), 43-46 (prior review
under the federal rule) supra and accompanying text.
108. "The rule does not speak to the issue that will be raised in civil cases if the docu-
ment that is used to refresh a witness' recollection falls under the work product doc-
trine .... The issue is left for development in the traditional common law fashion."
MINN. R. EvID. 612, Committee Comment.
109. Judge Weinstein states the Minnesota Committee Comment on the treatment of
work product under the Minnesota rule "explains the unresolved issue in the [federal]
rule." 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 7, 612[04], at 221 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
110. MINN. R. EvID. 612, Committee Comment.
111. See note 73 supra.
112. Se notes 70-79 supra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 97-102 supra and accompanying text.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court has not interpreted the scope of the
Minnesota rule, and no other state courts have construed their versions of
the rule.11 4 The federal decisions, therefore, currently represent the only
case law on Rule 612 and privileges. 1 5 Those decisions are far from
being in agreement and lend further uncertainty as to exactly how the
Minnesota court will view the rule.
V. CONCLUSION
The cases and legislative history concerning Rule 612 fail to provide
definitive guidance regarding the treatment of privileged materials used
to refresh a witness' recollection. Several alternative constructions exist:
(1) Rule 612 codifies the common law, which allowed inspection of priv-
ileged documents only when review was on the witness stand; (2) Rule
612 itself overcomes privileges thereby allowing inspection of any privi-
leged document used by a witness to refresh his memory; or (3) Rule 612
generally favors inspection of memory-refreshing materials with disclo-
sure of privileged documents founded upon common-law waiver
principles.
The dangers of improperly prompting witnesses and denying an op-
114. Many states have adopted rules that are for the most part identical to FED. R.
EVID. 612, see, e.g., COLO. R. EVID. 612; OHIO R. EvID. 612, but none apparently have
decided what effect their respective rules will have on privileged material that is used to
refresh the recollection of witnesses.
California courts have decided a small number of cases dealing with the use of privi-
leged documents to refresh a witness' memory. These cases, however, are subject to CAL.
EvID. CODE § 771 (West 1966), which states in part: "[I]fa witness, either while testifying
or prior thereto, uses a writing to refresh his memory. . . such writing must be produced
. .. Id § 77 1(a). This language resembles the preliminary draft of Rule 612, see note
46 supra, not the final version of the federal rule. Furthermore, as a student commentator
has observed, the cases that have been decided under the California rule are inconclusive
regarding the rule's effect on privileged materials:
Thus far no appellate court has required the production of a privileged
writing under section 771, and all of the decisions have indicated that the judici-
ary is unwilling to allow the statute to be used as a device for compelling disclo-
sure of privileged communications. On the other hand, the appellate courts
have consistently avoided directly resolving the issue of whether privilege stat-
utes should control over an adverse party's right to compel production. The
courts have evaded the crux of the problem by finding, often on questionable
grounds, either that there was a waiver of any privilege that might have existed,
or that section 771 was somehow inapplicable.
Comment, Evidence Code Section 771." ConAct with ffivileged Communications, 6 PAC. L.J. 612,
619 (1975).
115. Since the Minnesota rule was patterned after the federal rule, the federal case law
on Rule 612 should have some influence on any interpretation of the Minnesota rule.
Although the Minnesota Rules of Evidence indicate that state common-law principles
control the applicability of privileges in state proceedings, see MINN. R. EvID. 501, it
would not appear that Minnesota's treatment of privileges differs from that of the federal
courts. The federal decisions on Rule 612 cannot be ignored on the ground that federal
privilege law is incompatible with state law.
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posing party the ability to adequately cross-examine witnesses undoubt-
edly exist in instances of memory refreshment. Preventing a party from
inspecting documents solely on the basis of a privilege would seem overly
restrictive. Parties could avoid the inspection process completely by the
expedient practice of using only privileged materials to refresh their wit-
nesses. Similarly, an approach that would afford parties an unhindered
access to an opponent's files could result in abuses. Using a waiver the-
ory to complement Rule 612, however, would avoid both of these ex-
tremes. Privileges would be respected, unless the privilege is not
applicable or has been waived.
No matter how the scope of Rule 612 eventually is settled, there are
procedures in the interim that prudent attorneys should follow. As a
precaution, counsel would be well advised not to allow a witness to in-
spect privileged documents at random. Otherwise, a court that believes
the rule is meant to broach privileges may order inspection of the docu-
ments that affected the witness' testimony. It would be much safer to
provide the witness with unprivileged materials if at all possible. If privi-
leged documents are necessary to revive the witness' recollection, only the
smallest number of documents that are needed to accomplish the pur-
pose should be reviewed. This assumes that the witness' testimony is tac-
tically more advantageous than having the documents subject to possible
disclosure.
The rule may create offensive opportunities as well as defensive pre-
cautions. Counsel should ask opposing witnesses if they reviewed any-
thing in preparation for testifying. If the witness has, efforts to establish
which documents were relied upon should be made. The extent of the
witness' reliance on the particular documents also should be determined.
A demand to inspect the relevant materials then should be made, and,
assuming the opponent refuses, a motion to the court for inspection pur-
suant to Rule 612 should follow.
Rule 612 has the potential for catching many attorneys by surprise. t16
Attorneys suddenly may find sensitive documents that have been shown
to witnesses open to an opponent's inspection. Two federal district
courts have already reached this result' 17 and two other courts have indi-
116. In Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd
in part on other grounds, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980), the
court ruled that Rule 612 might represent a means of forcing disclosure of privileged docu-
ments that have refreshed a witness' recollection in future cases. The Berkq court based
this holding, in part, on the fact that counsel in the instant case would not have been able
to foresee the use of the rule in gaining access to privileged documents: "No less impor-
tantly, given the current development of the law in this quarter, it seems fair to say that
counsel were not vividly aware of the potential for a stark choice between withholding the
notebooks from the experts or turning them over to opposing counsel." Id at 617.
117. See Marshall v. United States Postal Serv., 88 F.R.D. 348, 350 (D.D.C. 1980);
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 8, 9-10
(N.D. I1. 1978).
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cated their willingness to construe the rule in a similar manner.' 18 On
the other hand, another federal court has refused to allow inspection of
privileged documents under Rule 612.119 Until the bounds of the rule
have been established by future judicial decisions, attorneys should pro-
ceed with caution when refreshing witnesses' recollection with privileged
materials.
118. See Cambridge Indus. Prods. Corp. v. Metal Works, Ltd., 4 Fed. R. Evid. Serv.
835, 837-38 (D. Mass. 1979); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613,
616 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), revd in part on other grounds, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
119. See Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Muller & Phipps, Ltd., 85 F.R.D. 118, 119-20
(W.D. Mo. 1980).
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